Democratization And Militarization In West African Sub-region

Democratization And Militarization In West African Sub-region

Abstract

The study is principally a qualitative exploration system counting substantially on secondary sources of data from internet sources, sanctioned documents and country websites as the system of data collection. We made use of qualitative- descriptive analysis as our system of data analysis, that is, talkie studies of sanctioned document and other accoutrements in assaying the secondary data. The major purpose of embarking on this exploration is to assess the democratization and demilitarization in the West Africansub-region as a result of ECOWAS intervention in Mali and Guinea Bissau. therefore, we were suitable to make the following top findings that, one, the legality extremity suffered by the ousted popular administrations hinders ECOWAS intervention for democratization in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Two, that the demilitarization performing from poor governance of ousted popular governments impedes ECOWAS intervention for disarmament of Mali and Guinea Bissau. On the base of this, we recommend, one, that there’s need for confidence structure measures to enhance ECOWAS intervention for democratization in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Two, that there’s need for public enlightenment to achieve successful disarmament of Mali and Guinea Bissau by ECOWAS.

Chapter One

Preface

. Background of the Study

Economic Community of West African States( ECOWAS) was established in 1975 primarily to grease profitable integration and development in West Africansub-region. But over the times, the indigenous profitable association evolved into indigenous security association through its military intervention in the conflict situations in the member countries and as well created a new organ, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group( ECOMOG). The peacekeeping intervention began with Liberian civil in 1989 to Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1998, Liberian Alternate Civil War in 1999, Cote d’Ivoire in 2002, Alternate Cote d’Ivoire Civil War in 2011, and Mali in 2012 and Second Guinea Bissau extremity in 2012( Agyapong, 2005; Belmakki, 2005; Levitt, 2008; Francis, 2009; Olonisakin, 2010; Yabi, 2010; Kabia, 2011).

The ECOWAS recognizes the fact that no meaningful profitable integration and development will be possible under conditions of conflicts as thesub-region was fast assuming the status of conflict region. Prior to the military intervention, ECOWAS had always reckoned on traditional system of conflict resolution as a result of wide conflict and insecurity in thesub-region in the 1990s and early 2000s, the leaders came to the consummation that profitable substance can not be achieved in the absence of peace and security. For illustration before the Liberian conflict in 1989, the ECOWAS reckoned on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms like agreement in Niger and other cases in thesub-region( Agyapong, 2005; Francis, 2009). ECOWAS is getting more a indigenous security association. But that doesn’t mean total jettisoning of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as the cases in Togo in 2005 where republic was restored after military accomplishments, demonstrated. Indeed in the cases of military intervention, traditional styles of assessing warrants and encouraging dialogue with the administrations were exhausted( Suifon, 2005; Levitt, 2008).

still, the military intervention by ECOWAS has not been completely successful in quelling conflicts, extremity of governance change and political race and military intervention into politics in the West Africansub-region and the Africa generally. The rearmost of these conflicts in thesub-region which ECOWAS has interposed are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The ideal has been to restore republic by forcing the service back to the barracks or confining it to the indigenous part of guarding the territorial integrity from internal revolution and external aggression.

But the root causes of military intervention into politics and extremity of governance change or political race are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for illustration, issues of legality extremity, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral extremity and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in utmost of the countries in thesub-region and indeed Africa as a total aren’t republic friendly or infelicitous for democratization and flourishing of republic or disarmament( Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011).

utmost scholars like Nowrot and Schabacker( 1998) concentrate on the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention while the likes of Olonisakan( 2010) concentrates on the effectiveness of the military intervention in quelling conflicts in the West Africansub-region.

. Statement of the Problem

The military intervention by ECOWAS has not been completely successful in quelling conflicts, extremity of governance change and political race and military intervention into politics in the West Africansub-region and the Africa generally. The rearmost of these conflicts in thesub-region which ECOWAS has interposed are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The ideal has been to restore republic by forcing the service back to the barracks or confining it to the indigenous part of guarding the territorial integrity from internal revolution and external aggression.

But the root causes of military intervention into politics and extremity of governance change or political race are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for illustration, issues of legality extremity, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral extremity and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in utmost of the countries in thesub-region and indeed Africa as a total aren’t republic friendly or infelicitous for democratization and flourishing of republic or disarmament( Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011).

utmost scholars like Nowrot and Schabacker( 1998) concentrate on the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention while the likes of Olonisakan( 2010) concentrates on the effectiveness of the military intervention in quelling conflicts in the West Africansub-region.