A Critical Study On Climate Change, Water Conflict, And Human Security In The Bawku Area Of Ghana
Chapter One
Preface
Background Of The Study
Climate change has been specially prognosticated by authors and associations similar as Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, and Lobell( 2009), Hsiang, Meng, and Cane( 2011), and the United Nations Environmental Program( UNEP)( 2011) to increase conflict, particularly in communities where poverty thrives, governance is weak, and instability is aboriginal. This connection has entered a lot of attention, as shown by global leaders’ commentary, media content, and book titles like Global Warring and Climate Conflict. The issue has not escaped the United Nations’ attention, and it has appeared in a number of transnational fora, including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the European Security Strategy, and the UN High Level Panel on pitfalls, Challenges, and Change. Climate change is claimed to have had and will continue to have an impact on rainfall- related hazards, including an increase in threat linked with severe circumstances convinced by change in downfall or temperature. The most probable consequences are failure and/ or flooding.
This issue has urged a variety of study systems over the last several decades, with varying results. Some of the early results include the fact that climate change seems to have fuelled conflict and negatively impacted the security of numerous societies. Others have revealed that, while climate change can play a part in inciting conflict, similar conclusions must be drawn with caution because conflicts are frequently the result of a complex web of relations in which socioeconomic and political factors frequently overweigh the benefactions of environmental factors( Benjaminsen, Alinon, Bugaug, & Buseth, 2012).
Despite these discoveries, further in- depth study using colorful styles will be needed to ameliorate one’s knowledge of the Climate- Water Security- Nexus and to grasp the precise impacts that climate change will have on mortal security and people’s livelihoods. The findings of similar exploration will serve as a critical tradition for policymakers at the original, public, and transnational situations to borrow programs that reply to climate change while also addressing conflict when applicable.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change( IPCCfourth)’s and fifth assessment reports( AR4 and AR5) both agree on the unequivocal severe warming of the earth’s atmosphere. These findings were reached grounded on compliances of adding global air and ocean temperatures, wide melting of snow and ice, and rising global average ocean position( IPCC, 2007, 2014). According to the study, these changes in the climatic system are substantially the result of anthropogenic causes mortal product and consumption habits, which, in the end, release gassy chemicals that are dangerous to biotic life. For illustration, the AR5 says unequivocally that “ it is veritably probable that further than half of the observed rise in global average face temperature from 1951 to 2010 was driven by mortal increases in GHG attention and other anthropogenic forcings combined ”( IPCC, 2014,p. 48). also, the 2007 study of the body of independent experts said that since the 1750s, massive mortal influence on the earth has increased the atmospheric attention of hothouse feasts( GHG) similar as carbon dioxide( CO2), methane( CH4), and nitrous oxide( N2O)( IPCC, 2007). Hulme( 2016) lately stated in his book, Should Rich Nations Help the Poor?, that he didn’t hash words. statement “ current profitable development is dependent on styles that increase CO2 attention in the atmosphere ”( IPCC,p. 93). He stressed that this shift is defined by “ energy- ferocious assiduity, transportation, and husbandry; deforestation; cattle raising; and an energy- sparing life and consumption pattern. ” Indeed, this rise in GHG attention is claimed to “ far surpasspre-industrial situations estimated from ice cores gauging numerous thousands of times ”( IPCC,p. 32 & 37).
The IPCC’s fourth and fifth assessment assessments both prognosticate adding global mean face temperature. For illustration, while the AR4 predicts that if CO2 emigrations continue at their current rate, global temperatures will rise from 2 to 6 degrees Celsius in the coming century, the AR5 predicts that by the end of the twenty-first century( 2081 – 2100), global mean temperature will have risen to between0.3 °C and1.7 °C. The egregious goods of this alleged rise in global temperature include, but aren’t limited to, failure, desertification, cataracts, ails, and ocean position rise. Brown and Crawford( 2009); Hulme( 2016); IPCC( 2014, 2007) According to Brown and Crawford, as well as Salehyan( 2008), similar climate change- convinced difficulties would complicate formerly- being environmental issues, with severe environmental counteraccusations for people and wildlife. Climate change, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies( 2011) and Werz and Conley( 2012), could beget mass migrations out of oppressively affected areas and( violent) conflicts because it jeopardizes some introductory mortal requirements, as well as reduce governments’ capability to give mortal weal.
The security counteraccusations of climate change were among the conversations and difficulties sparked by the IPCC’s release of the AR4. Though contentious, advances have been made in this field of study, including those by Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi( 2012), Gleditsch( 2012), and Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, and Schilling( 2013).( 2012). While one group of quantitative experimenters has set up some empirical substantiation to indicate a relationship between climate change and violent conflict, others have set up no substantiation or just weak substantiation( Gleditsch, Nords, & Salehyan, 2007; Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000). Several of these studies calculate heavily on either direct or circular models to draw hypotheticals or reach findings indicating climate change as either a direct or circular cause of conflict( Forsyth & Schomerus, 2013).
In the case of the former, environmental change is said to directly lead to conflict, as supported by Malthusian and/ orNeo-Malthusian authors. Attestations in favor of this link have been developed out of the accepted idea that certain disastrous environmental catastrophes have, to some degree, latterly socio- ecological ramifications. Davis( 2001), for illustration, established a link between El Nino circumstances and dearths in the late nineteenth century that killed millions of people across the tropics, and concluded that the event caused the shortage as a result of failure. Diamond( 2005) vindicated this when he stated that multitudinous circumstances of disastrous societal bouleversement and connects them to some environmental change, specifically climate change, as a cause of numerous. The circular model, on the other hand, contends that, while climatic change is connected with conflict, social practices or institutions, as well as social vulnerability( or adaptive capacity), function as interceding variables( Forsyth & Schomerus, 2013). As a result, the model hypothesizes that climate change, along with being shy institutions presiding over formerly vulnerable natural coffers, and consumers’ incapability to acclimatize adequately work as a” trouble multiplier”( Brown & Crawford, 2009; Scheffran, 2011). Blackwell( 2010), for illustration, acknowledges that climate change is the” underpinning relationship” between poverty and conflict among pastoralists in the Greater Horn of Africa. also, Temestgen( 2010) discovered that environmental declination, when combined with other social, political, and profitable factors, ‘ significantly increases’ the liability of conflict in the Horn of Africa. As a result, it isn’t surprising that these studies conclude that minimizing the implicit physical impacts of climate change would not serve; rather, boosting original adaptive capability and strengthening institutional regulations will prop in avoiding future conflicts.
still, as has always been the case in the perspectives of Barnett and Adger, the relationship between climate change and conflict has a direct or circular impact on any hand of mortal security( Kloos, Gebert, & Rosenfeld, 2013).( 2007). The scientists believe that the goods of climate change are concerning because climatic changes have produced large- scale social disturbances for multitudinous times. Burke etal.( 2009), Hsiang etal.( 2011), Klare( 2001), and UNEP( 2011) have discovered some links between global climate and climate change factors similar as lesser temperatures and/ or lower downfall and conflict. therefore, climate change( any change in climate over time, whether caused by natural variability or mortal exertion) is anticipated to have an impact on the security of several countries through changes in the hydrological cycle and the quantum, quality, and variability of water coffers( National Intelligence Council, 2008). On the one hand, Gehrig and Rogers( 2009) say that the most egregious root cause of water- related conflict or violence is communities’ incapability to use brackish coffers for any use. Again, major hydrological marvels similar as famines or cataracts have been criticized for certain violent conflicts around the world( Carius, Dabelko, & Wolf, 2004; Swatuk & Wirkus, 2009; Swedish Water House, 2005; Thomasson, 2006; Turton, 2015; Ravenborg, 2004). According to these pens, the utmost of these water wars do between nations, with only a sprinkle being within countries(intra-states), which are constantly regarded as low- intensity domestic conflict.
Statement Of The Problem
The Upper East Region of Ghana is primarily drained by the gutters White Volta( which contributes an normal of 20 of the flux to Volta Lake on an periodic base) and Red Volta, as well as their feeders similar as Atankwidi( 270 km2), Anayere( 200 km2), Yarig- tanga, Abuokulaga, Tamne, and Yalebele( Namara, Horowitz, Nyamadi, & Barry, 2011). Away from these gutters, groundwater is frequently uprooted from boreholes or defended wells for utmost pastoral agreements as well as civic regions to round civic water force. As a result, the region is one of the least well- drained in Ghana, as well as the driest( hydro- climatic challenged zone) in the country. According to Antwi- Agyei, Dougill, and Stringer( 2013) and Owusu and Weylen( 2009), the UER, which falls within the Sudan Savannah, has been passing frequent famines due to the region’s high variability in downfall and temperature, and the Food and Agricultural Organization( FAO)( 2007) indexing suggests that the area’s dehumidification indicator of0.44 is on the high side. According to available data, the region has the loftiest frequence( 37 percent) of failure circumstances( Dovie, 2010), and Bawku and its environs are regarded the driest part of the country( Dietz, Millar, Dittoh, Obeng, & Ofori- Sarpong, 2004).
As a result, the region, particularly the Bawku Area, has seen a fall in groundwater situations where hundreds of boreholes have been sunk since themid-1970s to give potable water to communities( Frenken, 2005). In the event of climate change, it’s projected that groundwater situations will drop by 5 to 22 percent by 2020, and by 30 to 40 percent by 2050.( Ghana Statistical Service( GSS), 2012). downfall in this natural zone will continue to reduce in the future, as projected by Minia( 2008) and Stanturf et al( 2011). Minia, for illustration, forecasts downfall losses of-1.1 percent in 2020,-6.7 percent in 2050, and-12.8 percent in 2080. These will have an impact on the force of water for home and agrarian uses, forcing communities to acclimatize in any way they can.
Away from the forenamed hydro- climatic stressor( increased climate unpredictability as well as extreme events) encountered in this area, the Bawku Area is also regarded as one of the country’s hotspots of violent conflict( Kendie etal., 2014; Osei- Kufuor, etal., 2016). In particular, Osei- Kufuor et al reported in their Conflict, peace, and development A spatio- thematic analysis of violent conflicts in Northern Ghana between 2007 and 2013 that in terms of frequence of conflict between 2007 and 2012, Bawku had recorded up to 25 violent conflicts, far further than any of the hotspots in northern Ghana’s eastern corridors. Again, the region is appertained to be “ the most notable hotspots in northern Ghana, counting for around 30 conflicts, ” although Bawku’s aggregate is reported to be “ disproportionately larger ”( Osei- Kufuor etal. 2016). For decades, the Kusaasi and Mamprusi ethnical groups have been engaged in a violent struggle in Bawku. There are some political underpinnings to the fight as well( Kendie, 2010; Kendie et al, 2014; Noagah, 2013). Away from the conflict’s conceded ethnical- political base, it’s delicate to rule out the involvement of natural coffers in picking similar conflicts. As a result, these two opposed players seek to assert their authority over the area’s coffers. According to Kendie etal., dominance of access to scarce coffers similar as water by one group or community to the rejection of others may affect in violent controversies among druggies of the resource. It’ll therefore be fascinating to explore how, when, and under what conditions climate- related stress marvels and residers’ response to them will beget conflict in the area.
Ideal Of The Study
The main ideal of the study was to probe the relationship between climate change, water conflict and mortal security( “ Climate- Water- Security nexus ”) in the Bawku Area of Ghana. The specific objects were to
1. probe water sources used by residers in the study area.
2. Explore residers ’ adaptive and/ or mitigation mechanisms towards hydro- climatic events.
3. estimate how water and climate- related hazards, complicate or alleviate conflict.
4. Examine the social, profitable and political factors that either complicate or alleviate conflict.
Exploration Questions
The following questions guide this study;
1. What water sources are used by residers in the study area?
2. What adaptive and/ or mitigation mechanisms are employed by residers in events of hydro- climatic hazards?
3. How do water and climate- related hazards complicate or alleviate conflict?
4. How do social, profitable and political factors complicate or alleviate conflict?
Significance Of The Study
It’s pivotal to do a study like this because, despite Ghana’s recognition that climate change constitutes a trouble to her progress, no particular citation of the miracle’s conflict capabilities was made in the country’s National Climate Change Policy( NCCP) document( Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology( MEST), 2012). therefore, despite the fact that social development is a primary concern of the NCCP, all of the policy’s systemic pillars, including governance and collaboration; capacity structure; wisdom, technology, and invention; finance; transnational cooperation; information, communication, and education; monitoring and reporting( MEST), failed to make any unequivocal trouble to bandy implicit conflict issues associated with cl. As a result, this study will give policy guidance for policymakers and other stakeholders in unborn policy creation or updating of being programs on climate change to include conflict- related issues. Feting this verity will help to avoid unborn controversies and rather insure pot in any section of the country where water coffers are abundant.
Compass Of The Study
This study will only cover climate change, water conflict and mortal security in the Bawku area of Ghana.
Limitation Of The Study
The primary limitation of this study was the language hedge in between experimenter and the actors of the study, particularly those from the chosen areas.
Description Of Terms
1. CLIMATE CHANGE A shift in the condition of the climate that may be honored( for illustration, using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/ or variability of its characteristics and that lasts for a protracted period of time, frequently decades or longer.
2. WATER CONFLICT It’s any circumstance in which water becomes the casus belli of a variety of unwelcome relations, including minor verbal disagreement and chilly interstate relations, as well as hostile military conditioning or affirmations of war.
3 mortal SECURITY It’s the situation where people and communities have the capacity to manage stresses to their requirements, rights, and values.
Leave a Comment