A STUDY OF ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA, 1983-2011

A STUDY OF ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA, 1983-2011

 

CHAPTER ONE: THE 1983 ELECTION: THE ONDO DEBACLE

Introduction 1

The Ondo Debacle: Politics and Election in Ondo State5

ENDNOTES12

CHAPTER TWO: THE JUNE 12 ELECTION: THE MILITARY AND THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY

Background to June 12 Election of 199314

The Emergence of Chief M.K.O Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa17

Election, Election Result and Annulment of June 12 1993 Election21

Post-Election Violence 28

ENDNOTES39

CHAPTER THREE: THE 2011 ELECTION: PREJUDICE MASQUERADING AS ELECTORAL PROJECT

Introduction 41

Previewing the 2011 Election44

C.Pre-Election Violence47

D.Post-Election Violence49 ENDNOTE 63

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION68

Bibliography72

CHAPTER ONE

THE 1983 ELECTION: THE ONDO DEBACLE

Introduction

Nigeria’s voting process has been marked by violence. Unfortunately, recent instances of electoral violence have taken on an unprecedented scope and are altering in form and character, which has detrimental effects on the stability and consolidation of democracy. Examples include the contested and violent elections in Nigeria, where the ensuing hunt for justice through official and unofficial reactions has, overall, primarily been caught in deepening contradictions 1.

As a concept, electoral violence essentially refers to all organized physical, psychological, and structural acts or threats made with the intention of intimidating, harming, or blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during, or after an election in order to decide, delay, or otherwise influence the outcome. 2 The significance of this is that electoral violence has multiple dimensions, including structural, psychological, and physical. The physical components include the murder of political opponents, burning, looting, shooting, kidnapping, and hostage-taking, as well as the violent disruption of campaign rallies and armed attacks on polling places where ballots and boxes are snatched under threat of violence. The psychological aspect pertains to official and informal measures that instill fear in the populace, which may result from physical violence. These include threats to opposition forces by security agents or through phone calls or text messages. This structural dimension of electoral violence seems much more pronounced, being a product of structural imbalance, including coercion of citizens by government to register or vote, unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates, abuse of power of incumbency, falsification of election result, as well as the politicization of security and electoral officials. 3

It is also evident that electoral violence, like an election itself, is not restricted to Election day alone. It can happen before, during and after the elections. Pre-election violence any include acts threats against electoral stakeholders during voter’s registration or electioneering campaigns. Election day violence includes the snatching of ballot papers or boxes, assaults on opposition parties or agents, and harassment or intimidation by security agents. In the aftermath of an election, electoral violence may take the form of violent protests against electoral rigging, whether real or imagined, and of the state’s deploying its apparatus of force in response to the protest, thereby further fuelling the violence. In addition, electoral violence is a form, perhaps the most deadly form of electoral fraud which has been defined as “clandestine efforts to shape election results.4 This can be perpetrated both by the incumbent power holder to avoid defeat and by power opposition elements seeking to wrest political power form the governing party. In most cases, electoral information such as registration data, vote results, ballots; campaign materials, for example, vehicles and public address systems, electoral facilities such as polling and counting stations, and electoral events including campaigns ralies.

Finally given the fact that electoral violence can be employed by both the ruling and opposition forces, coupled with the wide array of its likely targets as enunciated above, electoral violence no doubt constitutes a major source of democratic instability. Indeed, it can pose itself as a fundamental threat to the prospects of democratic consolidation.

The Ondo Debacle: Politics and Election in Ondo State

Ondo state, also known as the “Sunshine state,” was formed on February 3rd, 1976, from the remnants of the Western state. It has a total land area of 14, 739 square kilometers, with Akure serving as the administrative center. The state is bordered to the north by the states of Ekiti and Kogi, to the east by the state of Edo, to the west by the states of Osun and Ogun, and to the south by the Atlantic Ocean. Yoruba speakers who speak several Yoruba dialects make up the majority of the population in Ondo state. Three senatorial districts, nine seats in the federal house of representatives, twenty-six seats in the state house of assembly, and eighteen local government areas make up the state. Ondo North’s three senatorial districts are Akoko North-West, Akoko North-East, Akoko South-East, and Awola, Ondo Central, made up of the local governments in Akure South, Akure North, Ifedore/Igaraoke, Ondo West, and Ondo East, and Ondo South, made up of the local governments in Odigbo, Irele, Ilaje, EseOdo, Okitipupa, and Ileoluji/Okeigbo. The distribution by senatorial district is based on the state of Ondo’s geographic encirclement.

What is now known as Ondo State can be said to have a long political history that dates back to the anti-colonial struggle led by the Action Group. It has been observed historically that Ondo politics and elections have always been characterized by a series of violence that led to physical combat among political figures. In other words, the Action Group ideology serves as the foundation for the ideologies of the political parties in Ondo State manifesto, too. So, it should come as no surprise to learn that since gaining independence, their politics have displayed a progressive inclination linked to the Action Group. As a political party, Action Group paved the way for a democratic political system in Ondo and other south-western states of Nigeria. 5

The Ondo debacle was one of the major conflicts that characterize the election in Ondo state. During the second republic 1979-1985, by which time the state has been created, the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N), Action Group successor in south west, continue to dominate the politics of the state. During this period, the late chief Mike Adekunle Ajasin Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N) won the government election of 1979, however by the second election of 1983, Akinwole Michael Omoboriowo, Ajasin deputy from 1979-1983 decamped to National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N), the ruling party at the centre to contest the governorship race with Ajasin. As it turned out Akinwole Michael was officially the winner of the governorship election by the Federal Electoral Commissions (FEDECO). The Declaration sprang out unprecedentedlevel of post-election violence across the state popularly refer to as operation Wet e during which many lives were lost, properties worth several billion of naira were destroyed. The state was in a house of war during this period.

However, it could be said that the violent resistance started when the plans to rig the election was revealed. Ondo citizens became involved in the plan to resist any attempt, to rig the 1983 election in favour of the rival National Party of Nigerian (N.P.N), amongst whom were the immediate past governor of Ondo state, Olusegun Agagu, former Education Minister, Prof. Tunde Adeniran and former Minister for Mines and Power, Olu Agunloye, Veteran Journalist and special Assistant on Special Duties to Ajasinin 1983, Joe Aladesoun. According to resource material, it is claimed that Joe Aladesoun told Saturday sun that the Ajasin group learnt of the plan to rig the election one year before the election. Consequently, he said, Ajasin tasked party leaders to finds solution to whatever plans the rival party might have to rig the election. Aladesoun revealed that three strategic committees were set up, finance committee which was headed by the present Afenifere leader, Reuben Fasoranti, metaphysical committee and the tactical committee.

He explained that the tactical committee, which he headed, was responsible for sensitizing and mobilizing the people. Aladesoun personally prepared the commentary that was read on the state radio every day. He, however, emphasized the fact that he did not mobilize the people to violence but admitted that he called on the people to defend their vote6.

Also, the 1983 Ondo fiasco was aided by the metaphysical committee. A resource document states that the committee built a fire in an egg, and the egg was used to burn down the solder-encircled FEDECO office. The soldier did not realize that the egg in the woman’s palm would be dangerous when they first saw it. The FEDECO office was destroyed by the egg that was flung against the wall. There were said to have been no fatalities. Also, it was asserted that the metaphysical committee member followed the soldiers who were transported into the state everywhere they went, dropped specific items on the road, and gummed their clothing. To safeguard the interests of the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N) Ondo group, the committee employed metaphysical abilities.

The 1983 government election in Ondo state was challenged in court in order to determine the real victor. The court was the one that overturned the decision FEDECO had made. One decision in chief Ajasin’s favor was made by the five judges who were present in Akure. Four out of the five justices at the Benin-based court of appeals declared chief Ajasin the winner. Omoboriowo fled the state as a result, and Ajasin of the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N) restored his mandate. 7

ENDNOTES

F. Paul Adebayo and J. Shola Omotola, “Public Perception of the 2007 Nigeria’s General Elections”, Journal of African Elections, 6(2), 2007, p. 2001.
O. Isaac Albert, “Re-conceptualizing Electoral Violence”, in Perspective on the 2003 Elections in Nigeria, ed. I.O.D Albert and V. Adetula,( Abuja: IDASA and Sterling Holding Publishers, 2003) p. 133.
B.C.Osisioma Nwolise, “Electoral Violence and Nigeria’s 2007 Elections”, Journal of African Elections, 6(2), 2007 p. 155.
Fabrice Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types and Consequences”, Annual Review of Political Science, 6, p. 223.
Emmanuel Ejeba, Electoral Reforms in Nigeria, (Nigeria: Hubpages Publishers, Osun, 2012) p. 1.
Ibid, p. 22.

Human Rights Watch: Nigeria: Post-Election Violence killed 800, 2011: http://www.hrw.org/news, 2011, p. 11, Accessed on April 9, 2013.