ABSTRACT
George Edward Moore contended that at least some of our views about the world are absolutely certain in his quest to provide a direct realist explanation of cognition and to counter skepticism and absolute idealism, which is a type of metaphysical monism. These views, according to Moore, constitute ‘commonsense.’ All of G.E. Moore’s classic works, including A Defense of Commonsense, Proof of An External World, The Nature of Judgment, Refutation of Idealism, and A Reply to My Critics, are aimed at proving the existence of an absolute external world whose existence is perceivable (knowable) via the ‘Commonsense’ understanding of reality (actuality). Moore’s direct realist explanation of cognition, on the other hand, claims that perception or cognition of the external world is subjective. The association between the distal stimulus and its percept was revealed to be indirect; however, the relationship between the distal stimulus and its percept is direct for Moore. Moore’s ontological view of cognition was unique and insightful; nonetheless, it was insufficient. Moore’s stance is debatable since it can only be supported if all epistemological accounts of cognition are naturalized in reference to a certain consensual language domain.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Some of the complex challenges highlighted by Absolute idealism (Metaphysical monism) to understand existent reality with certainty and impartiality sparked this investigation. The following are some of these concerns:
I All realities are interconnected internally (doctrine of internal relations)
(ii) Objective truths (such as those of logic, mathematics, and ethics) must be explained in terms of the subjective cognitive or psychological faculties’ processes (psychologism).
(iii) Universal knowledge is objective knowledge.
(iv) There are universal minds that are subsumed by others.
(v) In the universe of forms, phenomenological and exterior realities are copies of the original.
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